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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2028 
___________ 
 
RAYMOND E. PETERSON, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF UNIONTOWN;  
FAYETTE COUNTY DRUG TASK FORCE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00150) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 14, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN AND GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  August 1, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Raymond Peterson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Uniontown (“the City”) and the Fayette 
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County Drug Task Force (“the Task Force”).1  Peterson alleged that between December 
2007 and December 2008, Uniontown police officers violently assaulted and falsely 
arrested and imprisoned him on several occasions in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  The City filed a motion for summary judgment, 
and the Task Force filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.  The Magistrate Judge recommended granting both motions.  The District 
Court adopted the recommendations over Peterson’s objections,2 concluding that 
Peterson had failed to distinguish between municipal and individual liability.  Peterson 
appeals. 
                                              
1
Peterson initially named the City of Uniontown Police Department, rather than 
the City, as the defendant.  The District Court and the parties’ subsequent pleadings refer 
to the City.  There is no difference, however; § 1983 treats a municipality and its police 
department as the same entity.  See Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and its police department as a 
single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability.”)  The Task Force is an association of 
several legal entities supervised by the District Attorney of Fayette County.  The Task 
Force denied that it was a proper party to a civil law suit.  We assume for the purposes of 
our analysis that it is a governmental entity, like the City, subject to suit. 
 
2
 Peterson filed “Plaintiff’s Amended response in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint,” which we construe as his objections to the 
Report and Recommendation on the Task Force’s motion to dismiss.  Although he moved 
for, and was granted, an extension of time to file objections to the Report and 
Recommendation on the City’s motion for summary judgment, no document that he filed 
thereafter can be construed as his objections.  Nonetheless, as he was never warned that 
the failure to file objections could result in a waiver of appellate review, his failure to 
object does not affect the scope of our review.  See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 
364-65 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s orders dismissing Peterson’s complaint for failure to state a 
claim against the Task Force and granting summary judgment in favor of the City.  
McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009); Abramson v. 
William Patterson College, 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).  Because we find no 
substantial question raised by this appeal, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
The District Court properly dismissed the complaint against the Task Force 
because Peterson failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  When a suit 
against a municipality is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the alleged constitutional violation 
must carry out either an official policy or a custom so “well-settled as to virtually 
constitute law.”  McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657-58 (3d Cir. 2009).  This 
involves a two-step analysis: (1) whether Peterson’s harm was caused by a constitutional 
violation, and (2) if so, whether the defendant is responsible for that violation.  Collins v. 
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).  “[A] municipality cannot be held 
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor . . . [or] on a respondeat superior theory.”  
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
Peterson alleged that Task Force police officers used excessive force, falsely 
imprisoned him, and confiscated money they found on his person.  He did not explain, 
however, why the Task Force, as opposed to the individual officers, was responsible for 
the alleged constitutional violations.  Nowhere did Peterson specify the particular 
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unconstitutional policy or custom at issue.  See McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658 (citing 
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)).  His argument was 
based, even assuming the truth of his allegations, on an inactionable theory of vicarious 
liability or respondeat superior.  See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City.  
For the same reasons that Peterson did not state a claim against the Task Force, he did not 
state a claim against the City.  Even when pressed, Peterson did not identify an 
unconstitutional policy or custom.  For example, his complaint alluded to his race 
(African-American) and the officers’ race (Caucasian), but nowhere claimed a policy or 
custom of racially-motivated harassment (or even that all of the harassment he suffered 
was racially-motivated).  Peterson’s response to the motion for summary judgment, 
moreover, did not mention race.  It did refer to what he describes as the City’s “custom or 
policy allowing and encouraging their Police Officers to use harassment and excessive 
force, and to warrant false arrests[.]”  However, Peterson presented no evidence of a 
policy or custom to support his claim; he merely insufficiently claimed that a policy or 
custom existed in light of what happened to him.  See Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 
F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2007).  As we explained, supra, Peterson cannot maintain his 
claims on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior.  
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
